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The Waterlogged Limits of the Infrastructural State:
The Failure of the T’aean Canalization Projects in
Pre-Industrial Korea, 1134-1537*
*
John S. Lee**
One of the chronic problems of pre-industrial Korean history has been
that of infrastructural integration. Throughout the Koryŏ (918-1392) and
Chosŏn dynasties (1392-1910), the Korean peninsula’s mountainous
landscape and uncooperative waters hampered large-scale flows of bulk
resources between the agricultural southernmost provinces and the
heavily populated Han and Taedong river basins. Of course,
governments on the Korean peninsula were not blind to the problem. Both
maritime and terrestrial infrastructures were priorities of the Koryŏ and
Chosŏn dynasties. This article focuses on a particular series of
infrastructural projects: from 1134 to 1537, Koryŏ and Chosŏn
governments made five major attempts to build a viable canal through the
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T’aean peninsula on Korea’s Yellow Sea coast.
Located along a critical shipping route for southern grain headed to the
capital region, the T’aean peninsula had been infamous since the Koryŏ
era for its rough waters, unpredictable tides, and proclivity for hastening
shipwrecks. A successful canal would have allowed grain ships to bypass
the treacherous tidal flats at the western base of the T’aean peninsula, an
area known as the Anhŭng headland. However, due to government
inabilities to mitigate the area’s formidable environmental obstacles –
namely, its extreme tidal fluctuations and hard granite bedrock – no
viable canal was ever finished.
Moreover, I argue that the canal projects’ repeated failures exposed
early Chosǒn centralization’s logistical and technological limits - limits
that, in turn, would shape the political economy of the Chosŏn state. A
comparison with late imperial Chinese hydraulic projects is quite apt here.
For Chinese states, the maintenance of the Grand Canal and other
waterways was critical to the political and economic well-being of both
the state and the localities. Accordingly over time, Chinese officials built
up an impressive array of hydraulic institutions and knowledge partly in
order to ensure the regular flow of goods and people between China’s
cores and peripheries.1 In contrast, over the course of the Chosŏn dynasty,
the state would take on a more hands-off approach to transport shipping.
From the mid-seventeenth century onward, the Chosŏn state would invest
in granaries and riverine transport rather than more ambitious maritime
infrastructure such as the T’aean canalization efforts.
The repeated attempts and failures of the T’aean canals highlight three
convergences of environmental and institutional factors: environmental
limits; institutional inertia; and the particularities of socio-environmental
relationships. The granite bedrock and sandy soil that underpins the
T’aean region strained the technological and bureaucratic capacities of the
1 Joseph Needham,Wang Ling, and Lu Gwei-djen, Science and Civilisation in China,
vol. 4, Physics and Physical Technology, Part III: Civil Engineering and Nautics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 211-378.
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Fig.1. Location of the T'aean region
Koryŏ and Chosŏn eras. Yet, successive governments pressed on with
canalization projects in the same area for centuries. Environmental
systems, in particular, can be prone to “institutional inertia,” the tendency
for institutions to continue along pre-existing paths. 2 Cost, geography,
2 R. Beunen and J.J. Patterson, “Analysing institutional change in environmental
governance: exploring the concept of ‘institutional work,” Journal of
Environmental Planning and Management 62, no.1 (November 2019), 12-29;
Johan Munck af Rosenschöld, Japp G. Rozema, and Laura Alex Frye-Levine,
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and uncertainty factored into government decisions to maintain the same
pattern of infrastructural decisions. Finally, the canalization projects grew
out of particular relationships between state, society, and the environment.
For canalization labor, the Chosŏn state utilized populations such as
soldiers, corvée laborers, and Buddhist monks who were deemed
expendable for infrastructural projects. However, the same populations
lacked any social or economic relationship with the canals and their
environs. Many workers absconded, and the government’s ability to
extract the necessary labor diminished over time.
Overall, the Korean governments’ inability to finish the T’aean canals
was indicative of the environmental limits of infrastructural expansion in
pre-industrial Korea. Over time, the Chosŏn state would rely more and
more on private brokers to ship southern grain, and administrative
expansion would largely unfold through the incorporation of local elites
and administrative agents in the latter half of the dynasty.3 All the while,
ships and sailors would continue to meet their demise in the Anhŭng mud
flats, but that would be a price the Chosǒn state was willing to pay.
The Five Canalization Attempts, 1134-1537
The Anhŭng headland and the wider T’aean peninsula is part of the
Korean western and southern coastal landform famous for its considerable
tide variation. The region is defined by endless submerged mud flats and
treacherous currents that bedeviled ships of the Koryŏ and Chosǒn
periods. A single miscalculation could wreck the ships in the thick mud
flats, or worse, in the rocky outgrowths and reefs that dot the shallow
waters. The original name for the westernmost headland was “Nanhaeng”
“Institutional inertia and climate change: a review of the new institutionalist
literature,”Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews 5 (May 2014): 639-648.
3 John S. Lee, “The Rise of the Brokered State: Situating Administrative Expansion
in Chosŏn Korea,” Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 32, no.1 (June 2019): 81-108.
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難行, “the difficult passage.”; Superstitious sailors, wary of such a
foreboding name, called the area “Anhŭng” 安興 or “peaceful headland”
in hopes that the new nomenclature would pacify the strait.4
The first governmental initiatives to overcome Anhŭng’s obstacles
came in 1134 during the reign of Koryŏ’s King Injong (r. 1122-1146). An
1134 entry in the Standard Koryŏ History (Koryŏsa) cites an unnamed
official who advocates building a “waterway” (hado) to expedite shipping
through “Sodae,” a Koryŏ-era name for the T’aean peninsula. The
Koryŏsa entry notes that waters around the Anhŭng headland were filled
with “rapid currents” and “dangerous rocks.” Accordingly, a court
eunuch named Chŏng Sŭmmyŏng (?-1151) was sent to the area to oversee
a major canalization project. “Thousands of soldiers” were sent to work
on the canal; however, it was never finished. 5 The work was taken up
again in 1154 by Injong’s successor, King Ŭijong (r. 1146-1170); he too
failed to complete the canal.6
Later reports indicate that the first canal, known in records as the
“Kulp’o” project after an old name for T’aean, was planned for a length
of eight kilometers, and the Koryŏ kings completed approximately 4.5
kilometers before quitting. 7 Two reasons explain the project’s
termination. First, the base of the T’aean peninsula is layered in thick
granite that challenged the mid-Koryŏ technological repertoire. Secondly,
the builders lacked any efficient means for discharging incoming tides
and the accompanying mud flats. The region’s high ebbing tides, long so
cursed by local sailors, would trouble not only the twelfth-century project
4 Kang Hang (1567-1618), a Korean war captive taken to Japan during the Imjin
War, gave a brief account of the strait’s nomenclature to his captors and accordingly
recorded his description in his diary. Jahyun KimHaboush and Kenneth Robinson,
eds., A Korean War Captive in Japan, 1597-1600: The Writings of Kang Hang
(NewYork, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013), 4.
5 Koryŏsa [Standard Koryŏ History] 17.30b.
6 Koryŏsa chŏryo [Essentials of Koryŏ History] 11.16a.
7 Koryŏsa 116.19a-19b.
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but all subsequent canal construction in the T’aean region.
Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century and pirate raids from the
Japanese archipelago in the fourteenth century prevented any further
canalization work in the T’aean peninsula region for almost two hundred
years. Finally, in 1391, a civil official named Wang Kang (?-1394), who
was a distant relative of the Koryŏ royal family, proposed rebuilding the
Kulp’o canal from a north-to-south direction. His plan was ingenious;
Wang suggested digging from north to south in order to link up with the
remnants of the twelfth-century Kulp’o project:
Between the north and south ends, there is a channel built long
ago. The section that has been deeply excavated is over 10 li
[approx. 4.5 kilometers], and [the section] that has yet to be
excavated is not more than 7 li [approx. 3 kilometers]. If we
complete the excavation and link the ocean waters, then every
year, transport ships can avoid the dangerous 400 li of the Anhŭng
headland. I propose to start construction in the seventh lunar
month and finish in the eighth month.8
The ambitious one-month timetable implies that previous canalization
works were still in serviceable condition, and Wang must have been
confident that he could rapidly build upon the existing infrastructure.
Unfortunately, Wang Kang’s project met the same fate as his
predecessors’. According to the Koryŏsa, “due to the rocks under the
waters and the coming and going of the tides, anything excavated
immediately filled up.”9 Yet again, the combination of reefs, tides, and an
uncompromising granite bedrock stymied a governmental attempt to
circumvent the Anhŭng headland.
The next year, in 1392, the general Yi Sŏnggye (King T’aejo, 1335-
1408) declared a new dynasty, the Chosŏn. In line with the wave of new
8 Koryŏsa 116.19a-19b.
9 Koryŏsa 116.19a-19b.
John S. Lee 21
state formation across post-Mongol Eurasia, the new Chosǒn government
embarked on an ambitious policy of centralization. It moved the capital to
Hanyang (present-day Seoul), established new administrative
subdivisions, bestowed provincial governors with higher status and far-
ranging powers, and revamped the land system in favor of greater access
for members of the central bureaucracy. Officials also improved the
granary system to further ensure the shipment of grain as taxes to Seoul
and as famine relief to suffering areas.
The new and improved granary system was critical to early Chosǒn
centralization. Grain from Chŏlla province in particular brought in
precious revenue necessary to pay the growing civil and military
bureaucracies; furthermore, the grain could be distributed to various
localities to assuage famine and ensure loyalty to the new regime. New
granaries were strategically placed along the southern coast to ease the
shipment of rice to the sea, whereupon the grain could be shipped to any
part of the peninsula.10 The government also tightly regulated everything
from vessel sizes and delivery times to the number of boatmen per ship,
thus demonstrating the high priority placed on the granary system and
extent to which the early Chosǒn government directly controlled the
shipment process.11
However, early Chosŏn centralization efforts also expanded the amount
of maritime traffic through treacherous areas such as the Anhŭng
headland. The number of shipwrecks skyrocketed during the early
Chosǒn period. The Annals of the Chosŏn Dynasty (Chosŏn wangjo sillok)
notes sixteen ships met untimely fates in 1395,12 ninety-eight would be
10 Kanno, Shuichi “Chosŏn ch’ogi chinhyulgok unsong munje: Chosŏn wangjo ǔi
kukka chŏk chaebunbae kinǔng e taean koch’al [The problem of famine-relief grain
transportation in the early Chosǒn era: An examination of the state redistributive
functions of the early Chosǒn dynasty],”Komunsŏyŏn’gu 22 (February 2003): 193-
222
11 Choe Wan’gi, Chosŏn hugi sŏnunŏpsa yŏn’gu [A history of transport shipping in
the late Chosŏn era] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1993), 8-15
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wrecked in 1403,13 and sixty-six shipwrecks are recorded for 1414.14
Facing a loss of tax revenue and the disruption of the famine-relief
system, the early Chosǒn government took action. King T’aejong (1367-
1422, r. 1400-1418) dispatched officials to investigate the remnants of the
Koryŏ-era Kulp’o canal. In 1412, Chief State Councilor Ha Ryun (1347-
1416) submitted the following proposal:
The place where Wang Kang attempted excavation has elevated
geological features, and so if embankments are laid in accordance
with lowering [elevations], then the water is trapped [therein]. If
we placed small boats along each embankment, and [the space]
between the embankments is excavated, then when a transport
ship enters port, we can move [the goods] to the small boats. After
the small boat passes between the embankments, we can load the
goods on to [another set] of small boats between the
embankments.15
Thus, Ha Ryun attempted to circumvent past failures. Rather than
wasting time and labor trying to build a canal for regular transport ships
in such an environmentally treacherous zone, Ha suggested constructing a
smaller waterway of five connected reservoirs manned by sets of small
boats. Larger transport ships could berth near the entrance reservoirs and
then move their goods onto smaller vessels for travel through the new
canal. Though some officials warned that the granite rock bed would be
troublesome, King T’aejong and the Privy Council (Ŭijŏngbu) eventually
approved the plan.
Ha Ryun’s canal built upon existing infrastructure, and the project was
12 Chosǒn wangjo sillok [The annals of the Chosŏn dynasty], T’aejo Sillok 4.8.7. All
entries fromChosŏn court records are cited in reign year-month-day format.
13 T’aejong sillok 3.5.5.
14 T’aejong sillok 14.8.4.
15 T’aejong sillok 12.11.16.
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reported finished within several months in 1412 and 1413. The canal had
the following dimensions, listed by each of the five reservoirs and their
Northern Reservoir 32.03 18.65 1.5
Northern Embankment 60.16 12.03 5.41
Southern Embankment 141.14 12.03 5.41
Southern Sectional Embankment 30.08 12.03 5.41
Southern Reservoir 81.22 39.10 1.80
Section
Length
(meters)
Width
(meters)
Depth
(meters)
Fig. 2. Sections and dimensions of Ha Ryun’s canal
names.16
However, problems soon ensued. The granite bedrock still prevented
deep excavation, thus explaining the rather shallow proportions of Ha
Ryun’s canal. Even after the initial construction was finished, the
inevitable tides continued to spill through, and workers had to maintain an
arduous process of dredging mud and removing water. Moreover, the
environment remained uncooperative. Official reports noted that reefs,
rocks, and strong winds prevented larger ships from berthing near the
canal entrances.17
Meanwhile, ministers back in the court grumbled at the high costs of a
project they felt would never succeed. “In vain, [Ha Ryun] wastes the
people’s labor” the opposing ministers declared, “even though inevitably
there will be no profitable use. In the end, transports ships will not be able
to transit.”18 Sensing the partisan opposition in court, Ha Ryun warned
the king in the eighth month of 1413 that “the digging and transportation
works must not be abandoned.” The king responded saying, “Everyone
says that the project is not feasible.” Upon Ha Ryun’s urging however,
the king agreed to send civil officials Pak Chach’ŏng (1357-1423) and
Kim Hyoson (1373-1429) to T’aean to investigate the canal works. Pak
16 T’aejong sillok 13.2.10.
17 T’aejong sillok 13.3.12.
18 T’aejong sillok 13.2.10.
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reported back saying, “If the various ministers went between the eighth
and fifteenth days of the month and saw the ebb and flow of the tides,
then they would understand.” The king agreed with Pak’s assessment.19
What was Pak’s meaning? The eighth day of the lunar month is
typically a first quarter moon that yields a low neap tide; the fifteenth day,
on the other hand, results in a full moon and high tide. Thus, in that time
span, one could witness the extreme fluctuations of the infamous Korean
west coast tides – and the extreme troubles that the tides were wreaking
on Ha Ryun’s canal project. The king’s agreement with Pak signaled the
demise of Ha’s innovative but ultimately futile canalization scheme. The
next year, in 1414, the court ministers agreed to decrease the rice
shipment quotas for the southern provinces, thus surrendering precious
revenue in order to reduce the number of shipwrecks in the Anhŭng
region.20
A fourth canalization attempt came in less than fifty years, in 1456,
during the reign of King Sejo (r.1455-1468). In the second month of that
year, the Chosŏn government issued a series of edicts that included the
following:
The old dug-out harbors in T’aean are to be once again be
excavated. Whether transport ships can transit and whether there
are areas that [can be] excavated are to be thoroughly
investigated.21
There are two likely reasons for the government’s resurrection of the
canal projects. First of all, 1455 was a terrible year for shipwrecks, with
over fifty-four reported in the Sillok. Second, Sejo had a notable desire to
19 T’aejong sillok 13.8.1.
20 Kim Hyŏnjun “Anhŭngnyang ŭi kulp’o: miwansŏng ŭi unha kongsa [The
excavation of the Anhŭng headland: canal construction in Miwansŏng],” Chayŏn
kwamunmyŏng ǔi chohwa 4, no.8 (August 2001): 9.
21 Sejo sillok 2.7.15.
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raise central authority; his reign would see the execution of numerous
dissenting ministers, the promulgation of the Great Code of
Administration (Kyŏngguk Taejŏn), and territorial expansion against the
Jurchens in the northern frontier. In 1461, Sejo sent the famed minister
Sin Sukchu (1417-1475) to T’aean to investigate the feasibility of
excavation along Wang Kang and Ha Ryun’s previous channel. 22 Three
years later, Sin Sukchu led another group of officials and even two
princes to visit and survey the old Kulp’o works.23
After 1464 however, there were no further canalization efforts during
Sejo’s reign. Sin Sukchu lamented the aborted project in a poem:
On top of the ridge is a lonely fort
at the edge of the setting sun.
I climb to view to only see
the sea floating on sky.
The wind blows around the island
misty in fierce waves.
From remote homes,
thin smoke arises.
The port excavation was some years ago,
success not being reached.
From the mountain came a cord,
cut and retied.
Can someone explain to me
a plan for linking transport?
Drunk in front of my goblet,
I idly try to forget.24
22 Sejo sillok 7.7.19.
23 Sejo sillok 10.3.9.
24 Sin Sukchu “Ch’a t’aean tonghŏn’un,” Pohanchae chip 9 [1487], reprinted in
Han’guk yŏktae munjip DB, vol. 59 (P’aju, South Korea: Han’guk yŏktae munjip
DB), 347. Cited in Kwak Hoje, “Koryŏ-Chosŏn sidae t’aean pando choun ǔi silt’ae
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One can conjecture that the age-old problems – the hard granite, the
fierce tides – had again stymied King Sejo’s canalization plans. Sin’s
poem reflects the frustration wrought by the T’aean peninsula’s
uncooperative waters. For centuries, Korean kings and ministers had
pushed so much effort into circumventing the Anhŭng headland.
Unfortunately, like the alluring cord dangling in Sin’s poem, a successful
canal would be but an unfortunate dream, to be cut by tides and granite,
retied by ambitious kings and ministers, and cut again by nature’s wrath.
During the reign of King Chungjong (r. 1506-1544), Chosǒn statesmen
made one last attempt to circumvent the area’s cursed waters. In 1521,
civil official Ko Hyŏngsan (1453-1528) proposed a new canalization
project to the west of the older works, near the village of Ŭihang, in an
area far closer to the Anhŭng headland:
If we excavate the Anhŭng headland and Ŭihang [area] in order
to integrate transport shipping, then it would be possible to be free
from the curse of shipwrecks and lay profit for ten thousand
generations. I wish to employ sailors and marines to excavate it.25
Ko Hyŏngsan’s plan had two major advantages. First, unlike most of
the T’aean peninsula, the Ŭihang area had a sandy bed; there would be no
bedeviling granite. Secondly, the proposed canal length was much shorter,
with a total length of just over two kilometers. Thus, the plan certainly
seemed feasible, and the king approved Ko’s plan. Ko mobilized over
three thousand troops and worked on the project for over four months.
However, just as they were on the verge of completion, the project was
abandoned in 1522. Korean historian Yi Chongyŏng has argued that
wa unha kulchak [Canal excavation and the context of transport in the T’aean
peninsula during the Koryŏ and Chosŏn eras],”Chibangsa wa chibang munhwa 12,
no.1 (May 2009): 316.
25 Chungjong sillok 17.1.8.
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intense factional court politics throughout the sixteenth century often
sapped centralization projects of their funding and support; similar
circumstances affected the first Ŭihang canalization efforts.26
Environmental and labor issues further hampered the Ŭihang project.
While the new location avoided the granite bedrock, the sandy soil
necessitated constant dredging of the canal in order to prevent siltation.
Dredging, in turn, required a steady supply of corvée labor – an institution
that, by the sixteenth century, commoners were steadily trying to avoid
through payment and flight.
In 1535, Chief State Councilor Kim Kŭnsa (1466-1539) offered a
solution to the labor problem: the conscription of Buddhist monks for
canalization and dredging work. In parts of Korea, including the area
around T’aean, Buddhist monasteries were destinations for commoners
trying to avoid corvée and military obligations. Although the early
Chosŏn era is conventionally seen as an age of anti-Buddhist persecution,
monks still enjoyed meager protections unattainable for the average
commoner. 27 Kim Kŭnsa, in a diatribe against the rising number of
people fleeing to monasteries, proposed conscripting monks between 20
and 60 years of age and using them to rebuild the Ŭihang canal:
The excavation of the Anhŭng headland has always been a
constant concern of the state. Multiple times, it was on the brink
of success and then stopped halfway, to the consternation of its
supporters. If we drive out these [monks’] idle hands and make
use of their labor, then they will be of profit to the state.28
26 Yi Chongyŏng, Chosŏn chŏn’gi sahoe kyŏngjesa yon’gu [A study of the social and
economic history of the early Chosǒn era] (Seoul: Yonsei kukhak ch’ongsŏ, 2003),
184.
27 Kim Sŭngnam, “16 segi Chosŏn ŭi p’iyŏk sŭng ŭi chŭngga wa sŭngdo chojik ŭi
chaegŏn [The rise in labor-avoidant monks and monastic reorganization in
sixteenth-century Chosŏn],”Chosŏn sidaesa hakpo 66 (September 2013): 53-88.
28 Chungjong sillok 30.8.11.
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King Chungjong approved Kim Kŭnsa’s plan, and he ordered “skilled”
monks to be transferred to the Anhŭng headland to, yet again, resurrect a
canal. 29 A lower-level official named Yi Hyŏn (?-?) was appointed as
“Director of Anhŭng Headland and Kul’po” (Anhŭng Kulp’o
kyŏngch’agwan) to oversee the initial excavation process.
The next year, in 1536, Yi Hyŏn proposed a canalization plan to the
court. He noted that the Kulp’o location from earlier eras was unsuitable
due to the channel only reaching the depths of “two men,” thus rendering
it unsuitable for larger ships. Chosŏn officials still faced the same
problem of the uncompromising granite bedrock. Instead, Yi advocated
for another attempt at the Ŭihang route at the western tip of the T’aean
peninsula. In order to overcome the sandy soil, he proposed an ingenious
solution:
The [Ŭihang] location is laden with sand. If we dig up [the
sand], lug it on our backs, and throw it out over our shoulders,
then the labor costs would be too great. However, if we load the
sand on ships and throw it in the ocean, the work would be quite
easy.30
At a subsequent meeting of the High State Councilors, court ministers
agreed that Yi Hyŏn’s plan and the terrain around Ŭihang seemed
promising, and they reiterated the benefits of expediting grain shipments
from Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang provinces. However, officials also noted the
long legacy of canalization failures in the same region. Accordingly,
officials took a cautious approach. Authority over the project was given to
the Board of Taxation (Hojo), and the government dispatched a series of
officials to carefully survey the terrain and related labor and resource
requisitions.31
29 Chungjong sillok 30.8.11.
30 Chungjong sillok 31.9.1.
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Increased bureaucratic oversight also ensured that Yi Hyŏn would lose
his directorship. The Board of Taxation (Hojo) and King Chungjong
wanted a new director of higher rank who could “deal with written
documents,” implying that Yi Hyŏn, while clearly a clever planner, was
not of considerable education or status. Only two months after submitting
his new canalization plan, Yi Hyŏn was demoted to assistant director
under Pak Suryang (1491-1554), a civil examination passer with the right
lineage and credentials.32 While Yi maintained oversight powers under a
succession of new head directors, his demotion also augured a level of
official distrust toward a social upstart.
By the spring of 1537, the government had gathered over 5,000
laborers, mostly monks, from several different provinces at the Ŭihang
canalization site.33 By the middle of 1537, they had completed the canal,
and King Chungjong issued a promulgation praising Yi Hyŏn and his
latest head director, a military official named Kim Kongsŏk (1477-1553).
Celebrating their accomplishment of a task that “his own royal ancestors
could not achieve,” Chungjong issued promotions and rewards to both
men, including a horse of highest stock for each. Yi Hyŏn was promoted
into the upper ranks of officialdom (Tangsagwan), a notable feat for a
man lacking an evident civil or military examination degree.34
Unfortunately, the canal soon collapsed due to familiar issues: the
environment and labor. In a matter of months, the canal once again silted
up, and monks tasked with dredging had fled. Though Yi Hyŏn may have
had an excellent plan for sand removal, he did not implement a viable
solution for controlling the tides. Without strong barriers against the
area’s tidal fluctuations and a reliable labor force to support them, any
embankments would have gradually weakened to the point that sand and
31 Chungjong sillok 31.9.27.
32 Chungjong sillok 31.11.26.
33 Chungjong sillok 32.4.6.
34 Chungjong sillok 32.7.17. A royal gift of a horse (sungma) was considered one of
the most prestigious honors in Chosŏn.
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mud filled the channel. In 1538, Hwang Hŏn (1502-1574), a high-ranking
official from the Office of the Inspector General, concluded that the
Ŭihang project had proved fruitless. After the project’s completion,
monks had scattered, even throwing away their identification tags, and the
canal had collapsed and “become filled in with sand.”35
Finally, in 1539, Chosŏn officialdom turned on the architect of the last
viable canalization project on the T’aean peninsula. A report from the
Office of the Inspector-General (Sahŏnbu) denounced Yi Hyŏn, by now
magistrate of Tamyang, as a “wicked and ill-mannered” man who
conspired with eunuchs and royal relatives and “accepted numerous
bribes” during his tenure as head of the Ŭihang canalization project.
The Inspector-General report goes on to claim that Yi counted monks
“who barely came out to work” on the corvée rosters. He even supposedly
used project resources to reclaim mud flats into private fields. The
Inspector-General recommended his removal from office, and the king
assented.
It is possible that Yi Hyŏn was simply a convenient scapegoat for yet
another failed canalization effort in the T’aean mud flats. The accusations
seem far-fetched, especially considering that King Chungjong had only
recently bestowed Yi with so many accolades. More likely, the collapse
of the Ŭihang canal allowed numerous officials to express their
displeasure at the use of despised groups such as monks and the elevation
of upstarts such as Yi Hyŏn. Combined with the already long legacy of
canalization failures in the T’aean region, continuous efforts became
difficult to justify.
The Chosǒn government would never again attempt to canalize through
the Anhŭng headland. Southern grain shipments, however, continued to
maintain importance, necessitating attention to transportation
infrastructure. According to a government report from 1640, a full 93
percent of grain taxes came from the three southern provinces of Chŏlla,
35 Chungjong sillok 33.9.27.
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Kyŏngsang, and Ch’ungch’ŏng, with Chŏlla alone comprising 48.5
percent of the total.36 After the sixteenth century, the government became
more reliant on the use of merchant brokers and the encouragement of
private shipbuilding.37 The government also regularly corvéed people to
man government transport vessels, but the work was considered
dangerous, and corvéed sailors had a propensity to flee.38
In the late seventeenth century, the Chosŏn government expanded
transport infrastructure through an array of transport hubs and
strategically placed granaries. In 1669, the famed statesman and scholar
Song Siyŏl (1607-1689) proposed placing new granaries at the southern
and northern ends of the T’aean peninsula. Accordingly, northbound ships
could drop off their grain while avoiding the Anhŭng headland. The grain
would then be transported a short distance northward by land to be picked
up by southbound ships from Seoul. 39 While less efficient then a
continuous voyage, Song Siyŏl’s solution allowed ships to reduce losses
and placated the fears of corvéed sailors.
Thus, though attempts to canalize the Anhŭng headland ceased, grain
shipments wedded the Chosŏn state to infrastructural projects in the
T’aean region. During the reign of King Injo (r. 1623-1649), the Chosŏn
government ordered military garrisons based in Ch’ungch’ŏng province
to excavate a waterway through a narrow chokepoint at the southern
extension of the T’aean peninsula. The successful excavation created a
new island, known as Anmyŏn after its northernmost village, and allowed
transport ships to sail through the calm waters of Ch’ŏnsu Bay before
moving west toward the Anhŭng headland (Fig. 3).40 Even as late at 1826,
36 ChoeWan’gi,Chosŏn hugi sŏnunŏpsa yŏn’gu, 31; Injo Sillok 18.12.1.
37 ChoeWan’gi,Chosŏn hugi sŏnunŏpsa yŏn’gu, 22-23.
38 ChoeWan’gi,Chosŏn hugi sŏnunŏpsa yŏn’gu, 33-34.
39 Hyŏnjong sillok 10.2.3.
40 Yu Yŏngsaeng, “T’aean pando kulp’o unha ŭi yŏksa chiri chŏk koch’al [A
historical-geographical examination of the Kulp’o canalizations in the T’aean
peninsula],” Chirihak yŏn’gu 15 (1990.6), 54-55.
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royal inspectors investigating local conditions in the T’aean region would
take the initiative to examine the old canal works and quiz locals about
the feasibility of another canalization effort.41
41 Kim Myŏngsuk, “Amhaeng ŏsa Kim Chŏnghŭi ka pon 19 segi chŏnban’gi
Ch’ungchŏngudo ŭi sahoesang [The social conditions of Chŭngchŏng Right
Province in the early nineteenth century as seen by Secret Royal Inspector Kim
Chŏunghŭi],”Han’guk sasang kwamunhwa 37 (March 2007): 178.
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Source: Map of T’aean County in the Haedong Yŏjido [Map of the East of Sea], vol.
1. (Seoul: National Library of Korea, 2005)
Fig. 3. The T'aean peninsula in the late eighteenth century. The red buildings mark
the location of granaries. Anmyŏn is the island extending from the southern end of
the T’aean peninsula.
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Source: Photo by author
Fig. 4. Contemporary remnants of the Kulp’o canalization site. The area long ago
gave way to paddy fields and irrigation dikes.
Conclusion: The Environmental Limits of the
Infrastructural State
What do the failure of the T’aean canals indicate about Chosŏn society?
Chosŏn-era officials attributed the canal’s failures to a lack of willpower
and general malaise:
“Although Wang Kang was ultimately not able to excavate [the
canal], how was he able to accomplish such a great task with the
previous dynasty’s lax order and weak corvée system? … In
China, they even excavate canals of over 500 li. This Kul’po
project is crossing soil and marsh of but only 20 li. Because our
country’s people have a shallow psyche and have never
undertaken great affairs, they take everything to be difficult.42
For Chosŏn officials in the early sixteenth century, the failure of the
42 Chungjong sillok 31.9.27.
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T’aean projects only seemed to solidify negative comparisons with the
Middle Kingdom. The failures, moreover, fit into the moralistic
Confucian worldview of Chosŏn officialdom, in which an educated,
cultured, and ethical elite deemed itself responsible for the kingdom’s
security and prosperity.
From our contemporary vantage, the failure of the T’aean canalization
efforts also point to the environmental limits of the infrastructural state in
pre-industrial Korea. Historical sociologist Michael Mann defined
infrastructural power as the logistical capacities through which the state
penetrates the social life of a polity. The key techniques of infrastructural
penetration, he argues, included bureaucratic coordination, the spread of
literacy, standardization of coinage and measures, and the development of
communication and transport infrastructure.43 While pre-industrial states
on the Korean peninsula were able to coordinate impressive bureaucratic
capacities for political and social reform, they proved unable to overcome
environmental barriers such as those of the T’aean region.
The history of Korea’s canalization failures thus demonstrates how
environmental factors shape the institutional paths of states over the
longue durée. Each of the T’aean canal projects built upon the lessons,
failures, and infrastructure provided by its predecessors. Unable and
unwilling to discontinue predetermined patterns and preexistent
infrastructure, officials and workers spanning five centuries would wrestle
with the environmental challenges of the T’aean peninsula and the
Anhŭng headland. Finally, after 1537, Chosŏn officials gradually took a
different route. Middlemen brokers and private shipping took on a larger
role in the grain transport system during the latter half of the Chosŏn
dynasty. The government continued to invest in the infrastructure of the
T’aean area but in the form of granary construction and alternative
waterways such as the Anmyŏn project. Rather than pressing the
environmental limits of the T’aean mud flats, Chosŏn officials, merchants,
43 MichaelMann, “TheAutonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and
Results,” European Journal of Sociology 25, no.2 (November 1984): 116-117.
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and sailors found other paths.
In 2008, new South Korean President Yi Myŏngbak (Lee Myung-bak)
came to office vowing to construct a 540-kilometer-canal that would
traverse the Republic of Korea from Seoul to Pusan, connecting the
Yellow Sea to the Korea Strait. Coined the “Pan Korea Grand Waterway”
(Hanbando Taeunha), the proposed project would have involved
monumental feats of tunneling through Korea’s south-central mountain
ranges and the dramatic transformation of South Korea’s rivers into a
unified canal system. Critics lambasted the plan as a pending
environmental catastrophe and economic boondoggle, and Lee was forced
to drop the project. More than a century after the end of the Chosŏn
dynasty, infrastructural dreams and environmental realities still intertwine,
lingering over abandoned canals and paths not taken.
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<Abstract>
The Waterlogged Limits of the Infrastructural State:
The Failure of the T’aean Canalization Projects in
Pre-Industrial Korea, 1134-1537
John S. Lee
One of the chronic problems of pre-industrial Korean history has been
the difficulty of material integration between core regions of the Korean
peninsula. This article analyzes five major canalization attempts made by
Koryŏ and Chosŏn states in the T’aean region to address the problem of
infrastructural integration. Located along a critical shipping route between
the southern grain basket and the capital region, the T’aean coastline had
been infamous for centuries for its treacherous tides and proclivity for
hastening shipwrecks. Consequently, from 1134 to 1537, Koryŏ and
Chosŏn officials attempted canalization projects that, if successful, would
have allowed grain ships to bypass the most troublesome zones. However,
the canalization efforts all ended in failure. Utilizing Chosŏn-era
institutional records, I argue that the canalization failures: 1) exposed a
pre-industrial state’s logistical and technological limits, notably, the
difficulty of coastal canalization efforts in areas of high tidal variation and
granite bedrock, and 2) prompted shifts in the infrastructural priorities of
the Chosŏn state.
Keywords: Koryŏ, Chosŏn, T’aean, Anhŭng, infrastructural state,
canals, maritime transport
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<국문초록>
하부구조적 권력의 물에 잠긴 한계: 전근대 태안반도
운하굴착 사업의 고찰, 1134-1537
JohnS.Lee (DurhamUniversity)
전근대 한국 국가의 문제점 중 하나는 한반도의 물질적 통합의 어려움이
었다. 이 글은 고려~조선조가 태안반도에서 여러 차례 시도했던 운하 굴착
사업을 분석한다. 삼남지방과 수도 지역 사이의 중요한 항로를 걸친 태안
반도의 해안선은 지형적으로 암초와 천퇴가 많았고 해류가 매우 빨랐기 때
문에 선원들 사이에서 악명이 높았다. 이에 따라 1134년부터 1537년까지 국
가와 위정자들은 해난사고를 피하려고 대규모의 운하 공사를 수행하였다.
그러나 모두 실패로 끝났다. 이 글은 태안반도 운하 사업의 실패가 전근대
국가의 기술ㆍ인프라의 한계를 드러냈다고 주장한다. 그리고 조선조는 태
안반도의 부적당한 해안선을 대규모 공사로써 극복할 수 없어 조선 중기
이후 운송 기반시설대해 다른 전략을 추구했다.
주제어: 고려, 조선, 태안, 안흥, 운하, 해안 수송, 하부구조적 권력
